Air interdiction ( AI), also known as deep air support ( DAS), is the use of preventive tactical bombing and strafing by combat aircraft against enemy targets that are not an immediate threat, to delay, disrupt or hinder later enemy engagement of friendly forces. It is a core capability of virtually all military air forces, and has been conducted in conflicts since World War I. Aircraft that are used for this purpose are known as .
A distinction is often made between Military tactics and strategic air interdiction, depending on the objectives of the operation. Typical objectives in tactical interdiction are meant to affect events rapidly and locally, for example through direct destruction of forces or supplies en route to the active battle area. By contrast, strategic objectives are often broader and more long-term, with fewer direct attacks on enemy fighting capabilities, instead focusing on infrastructure, logistics and other supportive assets.
The term deep air support relates to close air support and denotes the difference between their respective objectives. Close air support, as the name suggests, is directed towards targets close to friendly ground units, as closely coordinated air-strikes, in direct support of active engagement with the enemy. Deep air support or air interdiction is carried out further from the active fighting, based more on strategic planning and less directly coordinated with ground units. Despite being more strategic than close air support, air interdiction should not be confused with strategic bombing, which is unrelated to ground operations.
Air interdiction can cause the physical destruction or attrition of soldiers and matériel before they can reach the battlefield, sever enemy's lines of communication, prevent soldiers and matériel from reaching the battlefield. It can create systemic inefficiencies in the enemy's logistic system so that soldiers and matériel arrive at the battlefield more slowly or in an uneconomical manner.Mark (1995), p. 1-6Chun (2001), pp. 131–132Mark (1995), pp. 401–405
The IQAF's interdiction efforts peaked during the first 45 days of the war, but later declined to more sporadic missions, increasing in conjunction with major offensives. Interdiction by the IIAF was more sustained through late 1980 but after mid-January 1981 also declined. While both sides caused considerable damage on the other, with the Iranians arguably achieving more, neither interdiction effort was particularly effective nor did they play a factor in the outcome of the war. Both sides pulled back their air forces to avoid mounting losses and with the reasoning that, while they might not play a role in winning the war, they could still be used to avoid defeat.
Gulf War 1990-1991
21st Century
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